The Challenges and Opportunities in the U.S. Stock Market

William E. Hawes, CFA, CFP[®] American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) Greensboro, North Carolina Presentation February 2022



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Challenges

- COVID-19 continues to take a toll
- Inflation is rearing up and interest rates are or about to rise
- Margins may be vulnerable
- Valuations are elevated

1st Challenge: COVID-19 continues to take a toll

COVID-19 has taken a tremendous toll and reported related deaths are probably understated.

COVID-19 Deaths As of 2/16	6/22							
							% of	f World
	Officially Reported Deaths	Per 100,000	Estimated Excess Deaths	Per 100,000	Vs Official Estimate	Implied Population	GDP	Population
By Select Area								
United States	925,435	278.0	1,150,000	345.5	24%	332,890,288	24.5%	4.2%
European Union	987,041	220.7	1,300,000	290.7	32%	447,231,989	21.4%	5.7%
Japan	20,756	16.5	26,600	21.1	28%	125,793,939	5.8%	1.6%
Canada	35,674	93.7	29,000	76.2	-19%	38,072,572	1.9%	0.5%
South Korea	7,202	14.0	2,800	5.4	-61%	51,442,857	1.8%	0.7%
China	4,636	0.3	680,000	44.0	14568%	1,545,333,333	16.2%	19.6%
India	509,872	36.6	5,900,000	423.5	1057%	1,393,092,896	3.3%	17.7%
Brazil	640,076	299.1	765,000	357.5	20%	214,000,669	2.1%	2.7%
Russia	334,785	229.4	1,150,000	788.0	244%	145,939,407	1.8%	1.9%
By Continent								
Asia	1,328,147	28.4	10,100,000	216.0	660%	4,676,573,944		59.4%
Africa	244,770	17.8	1,895,000	137.8	674%	1,375,112,360		17.5%
Europe	1,671,912	223.2	3,050,000	407.2	82%	749,064,516		9.5%
Latin America & Caribbean	1,624,092	247.6	2,450,000	373.5	51%	655,933,764		8.3%
North America	961,109	259.1	1,200,000	323.5	25%	370,941,335		4.7%
Oceania	7,215	16.7	(3,900)	(9.0)	-154%	43,203,593		0.5%
Total	5,837,245	74.2	18,691,100	237.5	220%	7,870,829,512		
% Of Population	0.07%		0.24%					

Excess deaths = The number of people who die from any cause in each time period minus the historical baseline from recent years


Source: The Economist, Wikipedia

COVID-19 is already one of the deadliest events in world history in a very short time

Deadlist Conflicts	Mean Death Estimate	Location	Ended	Duration in Years
World War II	77,136,243	World	1945	6
Taiping Rebellion	28,284,271	China	1864	14
Manchu Invasion of China	25,000,000	China	1683	65
World War I	15,000,000	World	1918	4
An Lushan Rebellion	13,000,000	China	763	8
Dunguan Revolt	10,000,000	China	1877	15
Chinese Civil War	9,671,401	China	1949	22
Russia Civil War	6,708,204	Russia	1921	5
Thirty Year's War	6,000,000	Europe	1648	30
Mughal-Martha Wars	5,600,000	India	1707	27
Deadliest Disease and Famine	Mean Death Estimate	Location	Ended	Duration in Years
Great Chinese Famine	25,258,663	China	1962	4
All famines in India under British influence	24,750,000	India	1947	190
Famine and disease caused by WW II	23,065,130	World	1945	6
Famine and disease caused by Japanese imperialism	11,023,579	Asia & Pacific	1945	8
Northern Chinese famine	10,816,650	China	1879	3
Great Bengal famine	10,000,000	India	1773	4
Russian famine	7,071,072	Russia	1922	1
Famine and disease caused by Second Sino-Japanese V	7,071,068	China	1945	8
Soviet famine	6,327,717	Russia	1933	1
Famine and disease caused by WW I	5,745,181	World	1918	4
COVID-19	18,691,100	World	??	2+ years

Source: Wikipedia

The world stepped up vaccinations to combat the virus




Some daily figures are estimates based on incomplete cumulative data. Source: Our World in Data, World Health Organization, national sources, FT research. Data updated February 16 2022 2.10pm GMT. Interactive version: ft.com/covid-vaccine

Source: Financial Times


The world continues to go through COVID-19 waves

How global trends have changed



Source: New York Times


Central banks implemented significant monetary stimulus. They are now starting to tap on the breaks.



Source: BIS, FactSet, J.P. Morgan Asset Management; (Left) Bank of England (BoE), Bank of Japan (BoJ), European Central Bank (ECB), Federal Reserve System (Fed), J.P. Morgan Global Economic Research. *Bond purchase forecast assumes net government bond purchases as outlined in the most recent monetary policy announcements from the BoE, BoJ, ECB, and Federal Reserve through December 2022. *Central banks include Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, euro area, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, S. Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, UK and the U.S. Forecasts, projections and other forward-looking statements are based upon current beliefs and expectations. They are for illustrative purposes only and are not a reliable indicator of future performance. Given the inherent uncertainties and risks associated with forecast, projections or other forward-looking statements, actualevents, results or performancemay differ materially from those reflected or contemplated. *Guideto the Markets—U.S.* Data are as of December31, 2021.

J.P.Morgan

Source: JP Morgan Asset Management




Governments have implemented significant fiscal stimulus

Source: International Monetary Fund

2nd Challenge: Higher inflation and interest rates

Inflation is on the rise



Source: FactSet

Real GDP growth and inflation accelerated in 2021. Real GDP growth is expected to moderate in 2022-2023. Inflation may ease but remain elevated versus pre pandemic levels.

%, year-on-year

Real GDP Year-Over-Year Growth									
	2021	2022	2023						
World	5.6	4.5	3.2						
G20	5.9	4.7	3.3						
United States	5.6	3.7	2.4						
Euro area	5.2	4.3	2.5						
United Kingdom	6.9	4.7	2.1						
Japan	1.8	3.4	1.1						
Korea	4.0	3.0	2.7						
China	8.1	5.1	5.1						
ndia*	9.4	8.1	5.5						
Brazil	5.0	1.4	2.1						
Russia	4.3	2.7	1.3						


Inflation is projected to peak in late 2021 and remain above pre-pandemic levels (See report)

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Source: OECD December 2021 Forecast

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The debate continues whether inflation will persist. If inflation proves transitory and retreats, investment returns may hold up well. If inflation persists above 6%, investment returns may take a hit.



Sources: Capital Group, Bloomberg Index Services Ltd., Morningstar, Standard & Poor's. All returns are inflation-adjusted real returns. U.S. equity returns represented by the Standard & Poor's 500 Composite Index. U.S. fixed income represented by Ibbotson Associates SBBI U.S. Intermediate-Term Government Bond Index from 1/1/1970–12/12/1975, and Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond Index from 1/1/1976–12/31/2020. Inflation rates are defined by the rolling 12-month returns of the Ibbotson Associates SBBI U.S. Inflation Index.


Source: Capital Group

Past performance is not a guarantee or predictor of future performance.

Average annual returns at different inflation rates (1970-2020)

Stocks weaker in year 1 of fast tightening cycles

History suggests stock returns are more muted the first year or two after the Fed starts hiking interest rates.



Source: Ned Davis Research

Past performance is not a guarantee or predictor of future performance.

The Stock Market Does Fine When Rates Rise

S&P 500 performance when the 10 year treasury yield rises 1% or more since 1950

Concerns about rising rates and the negative impact on stocks appear overblown.

Inflation's impact on profit growth is more important.


Start Date	End Date	Starting Yield	Ending Yield	S&P 500
JAN '50	JUN '53	2.3%	3.1%	80.9%
JUL '54	OCT '57	2.3%	4.0%	60.7%
APR '58	JAN '60	2.9%	4.7%	40.4%
MAY '61	SEP '66	3.7%	5.2%	70.8%
MAR '67	MAY '70	4.5%	7.9%	-1.9%
NOV '71	SEP '75	5.8%	8.4%	2.8%
DEC '76	MAR '80	6.9%	12.8%	18.4%
JUN '80	SEP '81	9.8%	15.3%	11.4%
MAY '83	JUN '84	10.4%	13.6%	-1.5%
JAN '87	OCT '87	7.1%	9.5%	6.7%
OCT '93	NOV '94	5.3%	8.0%	2.2%
OCT '98	JAN '00	4.5%	6.7%	39.5%
JUN '03	MAY '06	3.3%	5.1%	39.1%
JUL '12	OCT '18	1.5%	3.2%	127.2%
ILE: BEN CARLSON +	SOURCE: DEA			FORTU

Source: Ritzholtz Wealth Management Past performance is not a guarantee or predictor of future performance.

Average annual S&P return over these periods = 10.5%

3rd Challenge: US margins may be vulnerable, and a contraction would likely serve as a stock headwind

The S&P generally tracks earnings over time




Source: FactSet

Past performance is no guarantee of future performance.

Margin contraction is a risk


Consensus forecasts call for S&P earnings growing 70%, 10% and 10% in 2021, 2022 and 2023. This forecast assumes historically strong margins.

If companies have trouble passing on cost inflation, margins may be vulnerable. If margins contract profits will be pressured. This trend would likely serve as a stock headwind.



4th Challenge: Stock valuations are elevated

US large cap stock valuations are high versus history



Source: Value Line Investment Survey

Value Line studies suggest positive mid single digit stock returns over the next 3-5 years


The Value Line Standard Edition statistics as of 11/12/21 are:

- Median P/E 17.7x
- Dividend yield 1.9%
- 3-to-5-year average annual appreciation potential +10% to +13%

From 1968 through today when the statistics were at today's levels, subsequent three and year average annual investment returns were:

- Median P/E: 3 Year +8.7%, 5 Year +4.0%
- Dividend yield: 3 Year +10.1%, 5 Year +7.5%
- 3-to-5-year average annual appreciation potential: 3 Year +9.1%, 5 Year +3.9%
- AVERAGE OF THREE APPROACHES 3 Year +9.3%, 5 Year +5.1%

Source: Value Line Investment Survey and FactSet Past performance is not a guarantee or predictor of future performance.



The S&P Shiller P/E is high suggesting more muted returns over the next 5 years


Source: FactSet Past performance is not a guarantee or predictor of future performance.

Different ways to invest in the US stock market

- Passive indexing
- Enhanced indexing
- Sectors
- Individual stocks

1st Opportunity: Passive Indexing

Stocks are the most volatile in the short run while volatility across stocks and bonds is similar over the long run



Source: JP Morgan Asset Management

Past performance is not a guarantee or predictor of future performance. Financial plans are hypothetical in nature and intended to help you in making decisions on your financial future based on information that you have provided and reviewed. Assumptions need to be reviewed regularly. Stocks are not guaranteed and have been more volatile than other asset classes. Government bonds and Treasury bills are guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the United States government as to the timely payment of principal and interest. Diversification does not eliminate the risk of experiencing investment losses.

Asset allocation perspective:

You should have these traits to be invested in common stocks

- Average to high risk tolerance
- Average to high risk capacity
- An intermediate to long time horizon

If don't have these traits, please re-evaluate your stock allocation.

If you have these traits, history suggests you should enjoy solid returns over the long run.

It is time in the market not market timing that makes a difference over the long run

US stock return studies since the mid 1950s suggest the same thing. Remaining fully invested generated significantly higher returns over the long run.

1954-1994 Return Study

1998-2017 Return Study

- S&P earned a 11.4% annual return
- If you were out of the market during the best performing days
 - 2% of the time you earned a 8.3% annual return
 - 4% of the time you earned a 6.1% annual return
 - 8% of the time you earned a 2.7% annual return

- S&P earned a 7.2% annual return
- · If you were out of the market during the
 - Top 10 days 3.5% annual return
 - Top 30 days -.9% annual return
 - Top 50 days -4.4% annual return
 - Top 100 days -11.2% annual return


Past performance is not a guarantee or predictor of future performance. Charts are for illustrative purposes only and do not represent an actual investment or performance of any specific investment. The S&P 500 is an unmanaged index of 500 stocks that is generally representative of the performance of larger US companies. An investor can not invest directly in an index. Unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses or sales charges. Dividends are subject to reinvestment.

- "The Big Money is not in the buying and the selling. But in the waiting." – Charlie Munger
- "Look at market fluctuations as your friend rather than your enemy; profit from folly rather than participate in it."
 Warren Buffett
- "The courage to press on regardlessregardless of whether we face calm or rough seas, and especially when the markets howl around us – is the quintessential attribute of a successful investor." – Jack Bogle

Source: Peter Lynch One Up On Wall Street, Legg Mason, <u>www.brainyquote.com</u>, <u>www.quotefancy.com</u>

It is time in the market not market timing that makes a difference over the long run

S&P 500 Bull Markets Often Surpass Bear Markets in Both Duration and Magnitude



Source: Morningstar Past performance is not a guarantee or predictor of future performance.

2nd Opportunity: Enhanced Indexing

Value, small cap, quality, momentum and low volatility stocks have generally outperformed the broader market over time

		Well-known systematic	Tactors based on acad	enne research			
					Average Annua	Excess Return	
Factor	Captures excess returns from	Rationale	Source & Time Period	Since Inception	50 Years	20 Years	10 Years
Value	Stocks that have low prices relative to their fundamental value	Value stocks are under appreciated by investors. Investors want to say they are invested in the current era's growth stories and over estimate the durability of growth. Value stocks have greater leverage and lower margins and return on asset. Investors need to be compensated for taking greater risk.	Ken Fama price/book value 1926 to Present, price/earnings and price/cash flow 1951 to Present	2.6%, 4.9%, 3.6%	2.0%, 3.0%, 2.3%	-0.7%, 2.4%, .8%	-8.5%, -4.7%, -7.4
Size/Small Cap	Smaller firms by market capitalization relative to their larger counterparts	Smaller firms are under followed relative to larger firms. Smaller firms have more leverage and lower margins and returns on asset. Investors need to be compensated for taking greater risk.	Ken Fama small cap vs large cap 1926 to Present	1.7%	0.5%	2.5%	-4.6%
Quality	Stocks that earn high investment returns, enjoy low capital intensity, low earnings accruals	Higher quality firms possess competitive advantages/moats that enable these firms to outperform.	Ken Fama ROE, investment level, working capital accruals 1963 to Present	3.8%, 3.1%, 3.3%	4.1%, 3.6%, 2.8%	6.6%, 3.3%, 1.6%	5.3%, -1.3%, 4.6%
Momentum	Stocks that enjoy positive relative returns	Investors under estimate the persistence of superior performance	Ken Fama large and small company 2-12 month stock returns 1927 to Present	6.6%	6.6%	1.2%	3.3%
Low Volatility	Stocks that have lower volatility, beta and/or idiosyncratic risk	Investors overpay for more volatile stocks in the pursuit of higher investment returns	Ken Fama stock return variance 1963 to Present	4.2%	4.8%	6.4%	4.9%

Past performance is not a guarantee or predictor of future performance.


Research Affiliates provides data on US factors. Checks reflect attractive valuation gaps.

Sources: CRSP/Compustat and Worldscope/Datastream	Gen-1 Value		Low Volatility		Quality		Standard Mome	entum	Small Cap	
Description	The Gen-1 Value simulati top 1,000 by market cap composite value score ca Book/Price, five-year sal two-year earnings per sh weighted by the product capitalization, and rebala	alculated using es per share growth, and are growth. Stocks are of this score and market	The Low Volatility simul- lowest-volatility stocks f market cap, where volati standard deviation of da year. Stocks are weighte rebalanced quarterly.	rom the top 500 by lity is defined as the ily returns over the prior	The Quality simulation s US Large + Mid Cap univ score. Quality score com equity with low debt to e variability. Stocks are we times quality score and a annually.	bines high return on quity and low earnings ighted by market cap	top third of companies b 1,000 US stocks by mark is defined as prior-year r	m simulation selects the ny momentum from the top ket cap, where momentum return, skipping the most e weighted by market cap terly.	The Small Cap simulatio through 3,000 by marke market cap. Stocks are n	
EXPECTED RETURNS (ANN.)	NET OF TRADING COST	GROSS OF TRADING COST	NET OF TRADING COST	GROSS OF TRADING COST	NET OF TRADING COST	GROSS OF TRADING COST	NET OF TRADING COST	GROSS OF TRADING COST	NET OF TRADING COST	GROSS OF TRADING COST
Expected Excess Return Over Market Benchmark	3.98%	4.06%	-1.32%	0.72%	0.29%	0.66%	1.58%	3.29%	5.05%	5.69%
Tracking Error	4.	8%	8.9%		3.7%		6.5%		11.7%	
Information Ratio (Gross)	0	.85	0	.08	C	.18	o	0.50	0.49	
	Gen-1 Value		Low Volatility		Quality		Standard Momentum		Small Cap	
VALUATIONS (STRATEGY VS. MARKET)										
Current (Aggregate) 🔘	0.	60	0	Л	1.	57	0	.92	0.	49
Median (Aggregate) 🟮	0	74	0	0.82		46	1.28		0.89	
Current (P/B) 0	0	53	0	78	L	95	0	.68	0	38
Median (P/B) 🔞	0.	69	0	79	1.	12	1	23	0.	70

Source: Research Affiliates


Only valuation gaps of 20% or greater are highlighted in the table. Past performance is not a guarantee or predictor of future performance.

Value looks relatively attractive versus growth



Source: FactSet Past performance is not a guarantee or predictor of future performance.

US small cap stocks look relatively cheap versus large caps



Source: FactSet Past performance is not a guarantee or predictor of future performance.

Advanced factor approach: Combining valuation and the economic cycle

- Valuation looks attractive today
 - Momentum
 - Small Cap
 - Value
- Factors usually outperform during different times in the cycle
 - Recovery
 - Small Cap
 - Value
 - Growth
 - Momentum
 - Quality
 - Slowdown
 - Low Volatility
 - Momentum
 - Quality
 - Value
 - Recession
 - Quality

Source: Resource Affiliates

Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

- Conclusion where valuation and economic cycle meet
 - Recovery If you expect economic growth to accelerate from here
 - Small Cap
 - Value
 - Growth If you expect economic growth to stay steady from here
 - Momentum
 - Slowdown If you expect the economy to slow modestly
 - Momentum
 - Value
 - Recession If you believe an economic slowdown noticeably
 - No factor meets both criteria
- ETFs to consider
 - SPDR S&P 600 Small Cap <SLY>
 - iShares MSCI USA Momentum Factor <MTUM>
 - Vanguard Value <VTV>

3rd Opportunity: Sectors

Sector Momentum

Leaders: Consumer Discretionary, Industrials, Information Technology Laggards: Utilities, Consumer Staples, Real Estate

Sector	2021E EPS Growth	Rank	2022E EPS Growth	Rank	VL Momentum Rank	Average Score	Overall Rank
Materials	82.5%	4	5.0%	9	6	6.3	6
Communication Services	38.3%	6	2.9%	10	4	6.7	7
Consumer Discretionary	85.5%	3	22.1%	3	3	3.0	1
Consumer Staples	9.0%	10	5.6%	7	8	8.3	10
Energy	NM	1	37.4%	1	10	4.0	3
Financials	63.7%	5	-10.2%	11	5	7.0	8
Health Care	27.4%	8	7.6%	6	2	5.3	5
Industrials	93.1%	2	34.6%	2	7	3.7	2
Real Estate	19.5%	9	8.2%	5	9	7.7	9
Technology	28.8%	7	11.3%	4	1	4.0	4
Utilities	2.9%	11	5.1%	8	11	10.0	11

Rank Scale: 1 Best, 11 Worst Source: S&P, Value Line Investment Survey

Sector Near-Term Valuation

Leaders: Financials, Materials, Communications Laggards: Real Estate, Technology, Consumer Discretionary

Sector 3-5 Year Annual Appreciation Potential

Leaders: Energy, Financials, Materials Laggards: Real Estate, Technology, Consumer Discretionary

				P/E	Premiu	m (Disco	unt)	Candor NT	3-5	ear CAG	R
	2021E P/E	2022E P/E	20 Yr Avg	2021	Rank	2022	Rank	Rank	Fair Value	Sell	Rank
Sector											
Materials	16.7	16.3	14.7	13.8%	3	10.9%	4	2	8%	12%	3
Communication Services	17.6	18.3	19.5	-9.6%	2	-5.9%	2	4	7%	11%	4
Consumer Discretionary	23.6	32.6	18.8	25.4%	5	73.1%	11	10	3%	8%	9
Consumer Staples	23.3	22.5	17	37.1%	7	32.2%	6	6	5%	9%	8
Energy	16.8	17.0	13.8	21.5%	4	23.1%	5	7	13%	18%	1
Financials	12.7	13.6	14.7	-13.9%	1	-7.8%	1	1	8%	13%	2
Health Care	21.2	16.7	15.4	37.6%	8	8.3%	3	3	7%	11%	6
Industrials	22.0	26.9	16.2	35.5%	6	66.3%	10	5	7%	11%	5
Real Estate	37.0	22.6	16.1	129.8%	11	40.2%	8	11	-8%	-4%	11
Technology	28.7	27.0	18.7	53.5%	10	44.4%	9	8	3%	8%	10
Utilities	21.1	20.3	14.8	42.6%	9	37.0%	7	9	5%	10%	7

S&P 500 Sector 3-5 year projections reflect Candor bottom-up analysis, Overall S&P 500 3-5 year projections reflect Candor bottom up and top-down analysis

Rank Scale: 1 Best, 11 Worst

Source: S&P, FactSet, Candor Asset Advisors

Past performance is no guarantee of future performance.

Overall Perspective

Leaders: Energy, Financials, Materials Laggards: Real Estate, Utilities, Technology

	Average Ranks					
	Momentum	Near Term Valuation	3-5 Year Potential	Rank		
Sector						
Materials	6	3	3	3		
Communication Services	7	2	4	4		
Consumer Discretionary	1	9	9	7		
Consumer Staples	10	6	8	8		
Energy	3	5	1	1		
Financials	8	1	2	2		
Health Care	5	4	6	6		
Industrials	2	7	5	5		
Real Estate	9	11	11	11		
Technology	4	10	10	9		
Utilities	11	8	7	10		

ETFs to consider: Energy Select Sector SPDR Fund <XLE>, Financials Sector SPDR Fund <XLF>, Materials Select Sector SPDR Fund <XLB> Rank Scale: 1 Best, 11 Worst

4th Opportunity: Individual stocks

Compelling stock ideas

Cigna <Cl>

- Cigna is well positioned as a top 10 health insurer that benefits from local operating scale and network effects.
- Express Scripts is a top 3 pharmacy benefit manager that has tremendous operating scale and benefits from high switching costs.
- Combining Cigna and Express Scripts with new strategic partnerships should round out the service offering and enable cross selling.
- Employing new lower sites of care, digital tools and end-to-end clinical programs should improve patient access, lower healthcare costs and drive market share gains.
- The valuation is compelling with a 10x P/E and 1.3% dividend yield. Cigna offers 15%+ 3–5-year annual return potential.
- Lazard <LAZ>
 - Asset management and financial advisory businesses operate in a complementary way, offer diversification and earn attractive rates of return.
 - The asset management franchise is well positioned with a focus on global, regional and emerging market institutional investment management. These areas are generally stickier and less fee sensitive. Revenues should benefit from asset appreciation over time.
 - The financial advisory business benefits from a global platform, an extensive advisory services offering, and network effects. These advantages have translated into market share gains over the last 15 years.
 - Growth opportunities remain via inorganic team acquisitions and organic talent hiring, technology investments and geographic expansion.
 - Lazard offers 20%+ 3–5-year annual return potential. The stock now trades at trades at 9x earnings and has a 4.3% dividend yield.
- LyondellBasell <LYB>
 - Lyondell enjoys global production scale and diversification. Lyondell has earned #1-3 share positions through being a cost competitive supplier.
 - Recent capacity expansion and JV initiatives should aid EBITDA by a significant amount in the coming years.
 - Management has done an excellent job improving the balance sheet and driving down costs.
 - Lyondell offers 17%+ 3–5-year annual return potential. The current valuation is attractive at a 4.7% dividend yield and 6x P/E.

For more information

• Check out our website at:

www.candorassetadvisors.com



Candor Asset Advisors, LLC is an investment management and financial advisory firm located in Austin, Texas. We help our clients identify, refine and achieve their financial goals by providing sound investment advice, focused planning, prudent asset allocation and effective portfolio management.

Achieving these financial goals helps you realize what's important to you -- whether that's purchasing a home, funding a child's education, taking the vacation of your dreams, starting a business, providing care for loved ones, making charitable donations, or retiring on your terms.

Honesty, integrity and customer service are at the heart of everything we do. We believe open communication is essential. We employ a collaborative process to understand your goals, constraints, life events, risk tolerance and time horizon so that we can tailor our recommendations to you.

Thank you for your interest in our firm. Please reach out if you would like to know more.

- Sign up to receive our insights by emailing us @:
 - info@candorassetadvisors.com
- To schedule a conversation, use the following link:
 - <u>https://calendly.com/bhawes-</u> <u>1/brief_conversation</u>

William E. Hawes, CFA, CFP® President & Chief Investment Officer

With over 22 years of industry experience, Bill brings a wealth of knowledge in investment management. Prior to earning his MBA, Bill worked in mortgage banking and insurance, and the insights gained provided him with a broader perspective of the financial issues facing clients.

Bill has been a Chartered Financial Analyst since 2000 and is a member of the CFA Society of Austin. Bill also enjoys golf, travel, studying history, watching his favorite sports teams and spending time with family.



Before founding Candor Asset Advisors, LLC, Bill co-created and managed Century Management's Large Cap Absolute Value and Large Cap Value strategies. Bill also analyzed companies in a variety of industries for the firm's all cap value strategy.

Prior to moving back to Texas, Bill served as an equity analyst for Engemann Asset Management in Southern California. He co-managed a mid-cap growth fund and served as an multi-sector analyst for the mid cap and large cap growth team.

After graduate school, Bill served as co-portfolio manager and equity analyst at Franklin Templeton. While there he served as portfolio manager on All Cap, Large Cap Core and Consumer Sector portfolios. Notable institutional clients included CalPers, Mitsui Trust, Norges Bank and Penn Mutual. He also spent considerable time analyzing auto, transportation and consumer stocks.

Bill earned his Master in Business Administration from the University of Southern California. While there he also served on USC's MBA student investment fund.

Between his graduate and undergraduate studies, Bill worked at North American Mortgage Company in California as a management trainee and later as a financial analyst and marketing coordinator. The experience gave him a better understanding of the mortgage and real estate markets which he leverages to this day.

Bill earned his Bachelor of Business Administration from the University of Texas at Austin. While a student, he also served as a special agent for Northwestern Mutual. The experience gave him an understanding of life and disability insurance and the work ethic, tools and temperament needed to grow a financial services practice.



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Investment advisory and financial planning services offered through Candor Asset Advisors, LLC, a registered investment advisor.

Disclosures

- Investment advisory and financial planning services offered through Candor Asset Advisors, LLC, a registered investment advisor.
- Past performance is not a guarantee or predictor of future performance.
- Financial plans are hypothetical in nature and intended to help you in making decisions on your financial future based on information that you have provided and reviewed. Assumptions need to be reviewed regularly.
- Stocks are not guaranteed and have been more volatile than other asset classes. Government bonds and Treasury bills are guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the United States government as to the timely payment of principal and interest.
- Diversification does not eliminate the risk of experiencing investment losses.
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Appendix

- Recessions
- Corrections and Bear Markets

Recessions, corrections, bear markets and rallies

Providing historical context

What is a recession?


A recession according to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), which is the official arbiter in characterizing business cycles, defines an economic recession as "a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales." In practice this means a recession can represent a slowdown in economic growth over a few quarters rather an actual decline in economic statistics.

US Business Cycle History Since 1854

Data highlights

- The average economic expansion lasts 2.2 to 6.3 years
- The average economic contraction lasts 10-22 months

Peak month (Peak Quarter)	Trough month (Trough Quarter)	Contraction	Expansion	Cycle			
		Duration, peak to trough	Duration, trough to peak	Duration, trough to trough	Duration, pea to peak		
	December 1854 (1854Q4)						
June 1857 (1857Q2)	December 1858 (1858Q4)	18	30	48			
October 1860 (1860Q3)	June 1861 (1861Q3)	8	22	30	40		
April 1865 (1865Q1)	December 1867 (1868Q1)	32	46	78	54		
June 1869 (1869Q2)	December 1870 (1870Q4)	18	18	36	50		
October 1873 (1873Q3)	March 1879 (1879Q1)	65	34	99	52		
March 1882 (1882Q1)	May 1885 (1885Q2)	38	36	74	101		
March 1887 (1887Q2)	April 1888 (1888Q1)	13	22	35	60		
July 1890 (1890Q3)	May 1891 (1891Q2)	10	27	37	40		
January 1893 (1893Q1)	June 1894 (1894Q2)	17	20	37	30		
December 1895 (1895Q4)	June 1897 (1897Q2)	18	18	36	35		
June 1899 (1899Q3)	December 1900 (1900Q4)	18	24	42	42		
September 1902 (1902Q4)	August 1904 (1904Q3)	23	21	44	39		
May 1907 (1907Q2)	June 1908 (1908Q2)	13	33	46	56		
January 1910 (1910Q1)	January 1912 (1911Q4)	24	19	43	32		
January 1913 (1913Q1)	December 1914 (1914Q4)	23	12	35	36		
August 1918 (1918Q3)	March 1919 (1919Q1)	7	44	51	67		
January 1920 (1920Q1)	July 1921 (1921Q3)	18	10	28	17		
May 1923 (1923Q2)	July 1924 (1924Q3)	14	22	36	40		
October 1926 (1926Q3)	November 1927 (1927Q4)	13	27	40	41		
August 1929 (1929Q3)	March 1933 (1933Q1)	43	21	64	34		
May 1937 (1937Q2)	June 1938 (1938Q2)	13	50	63	93		
February 1945 (1945Q1)	October 1945 (1945Q4)	8	80	88	93		
November 1948 (1948Q4)	October 1949 (1949Q4)	11	37	48	45		
July 1953 (1953Q2)	May 1954 (1954Q2)	10	45	55	56		
August 1957 (1957Q3)	April 1958 (1958Q2)	8	39	47	49		
April 1960 (1960Q2)	February 1961 (1961Q1)	10	24	34	32		
December 1969 (1969Q4)	November 1970 (1970Q4)	11	106	117	116		
November 1973 (1973Q4)	March 1975 (1975Q1)	16	36	52	47		
January 1980 (1980Q1)	July 1980 (1980Q3)	6	58	64	74		
July 1981 (1981Q3)	November 1982 (1982Q4)	16	12	28	18		
July 1990 (1990Q3)	March 1991 (1991Q1)	8	92	100	108		
March 2001 (2001Q1)	November 2001 (2001Q4)	8	120	128	128		
December 2007 (2007Q4)	June 2009 (2009Q2)	18	73	91	81		
February 2020 (2019Q4)	April 2020 (2020Q2)	2	128	130	146		
1854-2020		17.0	41.4	58.4	59.2		
1854-1919		21.6	26.6	48.2	48.9		
1919-1945		18.2	35.0	53.2	53.0		
1945-2020		10.3	64.2	74.5	75.0		
The red highlights indicate whe	en the peak or trough month has bee	n outside the peak	or trough quarter.				



The New York Federal Reserve Bank has a model that has predicted most recessions since 1959.

The model currently pegs the odds of a recession as 6% over the next twelve months.

Source: New York Federal Reserve Bank


Corrections and bear markets

- Stock market corrections are defined as a 10-20% drop in stock prices.
- Corrections usually occur every one to three years.
- Bear markets are defined as a drop of 20% or more in stock prices.
- Bear markets have occurred every 2.7 to 12.6 years since 1929. On average bear markets occur every 7.5 years.
- Since 1929, the average bear market decline registered 42% with the maximum bear market decline registering 86% from 1929-1932.
- The average bear market lasts 22 months.
- The 2020 bear market lasted only a month and registered a 34% decline.

Past performance is not a guarantee or predictor of future performance.

Bear market history

U.S. recessions and S&P 500 composite declines from all-time highs



Characteristics of bull and bear markets

		Be			ar Market Macro environment				B	ull marke	arkets
Market correction		Market	Bear return*	Duration (months)*	Recession	Commodity Spike	Aggressive Fed	Extreme Valuation	Bull begin date	Bull	Duration (months
1	Crash of 1929 - Excessive leverage, inational exuberance	Sep 1929	-86%	32	+			٠	Jul 1926	152%	37
2	1937 Fed Tightening - Premature policy tightening	Mar 1937	-60%	61					Mar 1935	129%	23
3	Post WWI Crash - Post-war demobilization, recession fears	May 1946	-30%	36	•				Apr 1942	158%	49
4	Eisenhower Recession - Worldwide recession	Aug 1956	-22%	11					Jun 1949	267%	85
5	Flash Crash of 1962 - Flash crash, Cuban Missile Crisis	Dec 1961	-28%	6					Oct 1960	39%	13
6	1966 Financial Crisis - Credit crunch	Feb 1966	-22%	7			•		Oct 1962	76%	39
7	Tech Crash of 1970 - Economic overheating, civil unrest	Nov 1968	-36%	7			*		Oct 1966	48%	25
8	Stagflation - OPEC oil embargo	Jan 1973	-48%	20	+				May 1970	74%	31
9	Volcker Tightening - Whip Inflation Now	Nov 1990	-27%	20	•		+		Mar 1978	62%	32
10	1987 Crash - Program trading, overheating markets	Aug 1987	-34%	3					Aug 1982	229%	60
11	Tech Bubble - Extreme valuations, com boom/bust	M ar 2000	-49%	30					Oct 1990	47%	1B
12	Global Financial Crisis - Leverage/housing, Lehman collapse	Oct 2007	-57%	v		٠	٠		Oct 2002	101%	60
13	Global Slowdown - COVID-19, oil price war	Feb 2020	-34%	1	•				Mar 2009	401%	141
	Averages		-42%	22						166%	54

Source: FactSet, NBER, Robert Shiller, Standard & Poor's, J.P. Morgan Asset Management.

"A bear market is defined as a 20% or more decline from the previous market high. The related market return is the peak to trough return over the cycle. Periods of "Recession" are defined using NBER business cycle dates. "Commodity spikes" are defined as movement in oil prices of over 100% over an 18-month period. Periods of "Extreme Valuations" are those where S&P 500 last 12-months P/E levels were approximately two standard deviations above long-run averages, or time periods where equity market valuations appeared expensive given the broader macroeconomic environment. "Aggressive Fed Tightening" is defined as Federal Reserve monetary tightening that was unexpected and/or significant in magnitude. Bear and bull returns are price returns.

Guide to the Markets - U.S. Data are as of December 31, 2020.

Source: JP Morgan Asset Management

Past performance is not a guarantee or predictor of future performance.



Sources of bear markets:

% of the time

- 77% recessions
- 54% extreme valuations
- 46% aggressive fed actions
- 31% commodity spikes

The % of time a recession occurs due to


- 23% one factor
- 46% two factors
- 31% three factors

50

Annual returns and intra-year declines

GTM U.S. 16

The S&P is up most years but intra year drops occur regularly and are often 5-20%



Source: JP Morgan Asset Management

Past performance is not a guarantee or predictor of future performance.